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Abstract
The solvency crisis in 2001–2004 urged Dutch pension funds to reconsider their ﬁnal-pay plans
with de facto unconditional indexation. Most pension funds switched to an average-wage plan
with solvency-contingent indexation. This pension plan redesign was the outcome of a new
compromise between the major stakeholders of Dutch pension funds. The redesign is of interest
as it results in a hybrid combination of DB and DC. This new setting indeed greatly improves
solvency risk management. Moreover, the new plan structure appears to be welfare-dominant
compared to other collective plan settings and individual alternatives, as it improves the con-
ditions for intergenerational risk sharing. However, drawbacks of the new plans are the lack of
transparency and potential welfare loss for individuals because of the inherent contingent claim
structure of the new plan. Moreover, the plan redesign has led to value redistribution from
older to younger plan participants.
1 Introduction
At the beginning of this century, pension funds in the Netherlands were hit by a fall
in assets due to a sharp decline in equity markets and an increase in the value of
liabilities due to a drop in interest rates to historically low levels (Boeri et al., 2006) As
a result, funding ratios fell sharply. In addition, Dutch pension plans adopted a new
accounting method using ‘fair-value’ principles that has had the eﬀect of making
underfundingproblemsmorevisible.Inreactiontothesharpdropinpensionfunding,
the Dutch government imposed strict new funding requirements in 2002.
Pension funds have become more vulnerable to the ups and down of the stock
market as they, in search of higher rates of return, mainly substituted private loans for
equity.Thisprocessstartedattheendofthe1980s,andacceleratedinthe1990s(seefor
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Printed in the United Kingdommore details Ponds and Van Riel, 2007). In particular, the switch of the huge civil
servant pension fund ABP to equities and the resulting internationalization of
itsinvestmentportfolio,hadahugeimpact(seeVanRiel,HemerijckandVisser,2003).
Theswitchtoequityledtohigherbutmorevolatileincomeofpensionfunds(Figure1),
putting pension plan design and implied risk sharingonthe agendaof pension boards.
As shown in Figure 2, the predominant reaction by Dutch pension funds after 2001
was to switch from DB–ﬁnal-pay plans to DB–average-wage plans. Between 1998
and 2005, the share of all active participants covered by average-wage plans jumped
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Figure 2. Percent of active participants in deﬁned beneﬁt
plans by type, 1998–2005
Source: Dutch Central Bank (2006).
92 E. H. M. Ponds and B. Van RielA typical characteristic of these average-salary schemes is that indexation of all
accrued liabilities is made dependent on the solvency position of the pension fund.
Solvency-contingent indexation in addition to ﬂexible contributions enlarges the
funds’ risk-bearing capacity. This is often ruled via a so-called policy ladder that is
part of the pension deal agreed upon by the social partners within the board of
trustees. A policy ladder relates the contribution policy and indexation policies
explicitly one-to-one to the ﬁnancial position of the pension fund.
This contribution evaluates the plan redesign in the Netherlands. Section 2 depicts
the plan redesign as the outcome of a new compromise between the major stake-
holders. Section 3 presents ALM evidence for diﬀerent collective plans. Section 4
evaluates the new plan setting from diﬀerent perspectives: welfare aspects, value re-
distribution between plan members, and transparency.
1 Section 5 summarizes and
concludes.
2 Search for a new compromise
Traditionally, risk management by Dutch pension funds in the postwar period was
done primarily by adjustments in the contribution rate. A high funding ratio gave rise
to contribution cuts, whereas a funding ratio that was perceived as too low led to an
increase in the contribution rate. Indeed, as a reaction to the low funding ratios at the
beginning of this decade, contribution rates nearly doubled. This sharp increase made
it clear that risk management through contribution rates exclusively was no longer
appropriate. Since most Dutch pension funds stem from the 1950s and 1960s, they
have now, after 40 years, a high degree of maturity – as a large group of members
has reached retirement age. Typical for a mature pension fund is that the ratio
of pensioners to workers is high, and also the ratio of the value of pension-fund
liabilities to wages is high. The ratio between liabilities and total wages is expected to
rise from approximately 2.5 now to 4.5 in 2030. This sharp increase will severely
undermine the eﬀectiveness of the contribution rate as a steering instrument. To
improve the funding ratio a 1% point would require additional contributions of
4.5% in the future, instead of the 2.5% at present. An indexation cut of 1% also
delivers an increase in the funding ratio of a 1% point.
A renewal of pension fund risk management would require ﬁnding a new balance
in the interests of the fund stakeholders. Pension funds in the Netherlands are in-
dependent ﬁnancial institutions with their own governance and administrative
structures separate from that of the employers. The legal status as a separate trust
gives pension funds a signiﬁcant degree of operational autonomy that is not always
present in the Anglo-Saxon trust model (Laboul and Yermo, 2006). Employers and
unions are equally represented on Dutch pension fund boards. As the number of
retirees has grown considerably over time, retiree organizations have increasingly
claimed a say in pension fund management.
1 Steenbeek and van der Lecq (2007) contains a number of contributions discussing costs and beneﬁts of
the Dutch pension fund system from other perspectives, among them mandatory participation, uniform
contribution rate, cost eﬃciency, macroeconomic issues, and more.
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sector, Dutch employers are less able to dominate and to direct pension fund man-
agement and policy. Employers therefore have to compromise more with unions. The
other side of the coin, however, is that they also are not regarded as exclusively
responsible for correcting situations related to under-funding and risk-bearing. This
contrast is accentuated by the dominance in the Netherlands of industry-wide pen-
sion funds, which are absent in the Anglo-Saxon world. For employers, it was im-
portant to address the declining eﬀectiveness of the contribution rate as a steering
mechanism, and to spread risks more evenly over participants and sponsors. But this
also was a concern for unions. Unions in the Netherlands have to strike an internal
compromise between the interests of younger workers, on the one hand, and the
interests of older workers and pensioners (who often retain their trade union mem-
bership), on the other. In most cases, moreover, union representatives in pension
boards are often closely involved in wage negotiations. This explains why unions have
been willing to spread risks more broadly between active members and pensioners.
An exclusive reliance on contribution rates to absorb risks would run the risk of
alienating younger workers and put a heavy burden on wage negotiations, as em-
ployers would try to shift pension costs to workers.
In most ﬁnal-wage pension plans, indexation of pension beneﬁts was, at least on
paper, dependent on the solvency position of the pension fund. Thus, in principle,
pension funds could have invoked this possibility and shifted investment risk to
pensioners. Given the maturity of most funds, indexation cuts are an eﬀective in-
strument for restoring solvency. This was not easy to implement, however, as the
conditional indexation of pension beneﬁts had been poorly communicated to par-
ticipants. Moreover, the clauses had been seldom invoked, as the ﬁnancial situation
of most funds was healthy or it was considered to be so in view of the old actuarial
framework for valuing pension liabilities. As a consequence, strong resistance from
pensioners might have been expected. Pensioners might have felt that they were the
victim of contribution holidays in the roaring 1990s, when they threatened to go to
court in case pension funds decided to shift risk their way only. As many pensioners
remain union members after retiring, unions could not neglect their concerns. A way
out was to broaden solvency-contingent indexation to all liabilities – including ac-
crued rights of active members. Technically, this implied a switch from ﬁnal-wage
plans to solvency-contingent average-wage plans.
3 Pension-plan redesign by Dutch pension funds and risk re-allocation
In order to determine more speciﬁcally the consequences for risk allocation from the
shift to solvency-contingent average-wage salary plans, we use an ALM framework
to compare the allocation of risk among the plan members in a typical current pen-
sion plan in both a traditional DB plan and collective DC plan.
3.1 Policy ladders
Figure 3 shows the functioning of a policy ladder for a typical pension plan in the
Netherlands currently. In this ﬁgure, the x-axis denotes the value of the assets A of
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equal the value of the real liabilities LR, the latter being the value of accrued rights
when full indexation would always be given. LR is calculated by discounting the
accrued rights with the real yield curve net of real wage growth. The value of the
nominal liabilities, LN, is the value of accrued rights when no indexation would be
given. The size of LN is determined by discounting the accrued liabilities with the
nominal yield curve. The diﬀerence between real and nominal liabilities, LRxLN,i s
the required indexation reserve that is needed to cover the indexation promise to the
participants. The actual indexation reserve position is AxLN, which may be either
positive or negative. Along the vertical axis, the contribution rate and the indexation
rate are set.
The base contribution rate is ﬁxed. There is room for full indexation equal to the
wage growth when the value of assets is equal to or larger than the value of the real
liabilities: AoLR. Then, the actual indexation reserve AxLN is at least equal to the
required indexation reserve LRxLN. The indexation rate will be zero when the assets
are equal to or even below the nominal liabilities: AfLN. The actual indexation
reserve then is zero – or is even negative. Between these two points (i.e. when
LN<A<LR), indexation follows the wage growth partly where the indexation given
is determined by the proportion of the actual indexation reserve in relation to the
required indexation reserve. When A>LR, catch-up indexation may be given up to a
maximum equal to the previously missed indexation due to indexation cuts. The
possibility of catch-up indexation is indicated by the dotted line.
Oﬃcial statistics classify current average-wage plans as DB plans. However, the
broadening of solvency-contingent indexation implies that the ﬁnal pension result
will be partly dependent on investment returns. The current typical average wage
scheme can therefore better be described as a hybrid DB–DC plan, keeping a midway
position between a traditional DB plan, with ﬂexible contributions and well-deﬁned
indexed pensions, and a DC plan, with uncertainty as to the ﬁnal pension result
because of uncertainty on the rate of return on investments. The hybrid plan is partly










Figure 3. Hybrid DB-DC plan
Sharing risk: the Netherlands’ new approach to pensions 95as a traditional DB plan, and because contributions are ﬂexible, depending on the
ﬁnancial position of the pension fund. The hybrid plan is partly DC by nature, as the
yearly indexation is related to the ﬁnancial position of the fund and therefore is
related to the investment returns.
Figure 4 is a stylized representation of risk allocation within a traditional DB plan
structure wherein indexed beneﬁts are guaranteed and funding risks are absorbed by
ﬂexible contributions. This can be seen as a stylized representation of risk bearing in
the Netherlands in the postwar period up to 2000. As in Figure 3, the base contri-
bution rate is ﬁxed. Additional contributions are not necessary when assets match
realliabilities:A=LR.Asituationofrealunder-funding,A<LR,orrealover-funding,
A>LR, leads to, respectively, a surcharge to, or a cut in, the contribution rate. A
situation of under-funding or over-funding is smoothed out over a period of 35 years.
A number of pension funds have gone one step further than the hybrid plan by
abolishing the use of the contribution rate as a risk-steering instrument. This type of
plan can be characterized as a collective DC plan with ﬁxed contributions but ﬂexible
beneﬁts, depending on the ﬁnancial situation of the pension fund.
The setting of solvency-contingent indexation in the collective DC plan in Figure 5
is the same as in the hybrid DB–DC plan (Figure 3). The contribution rate in the
collective DC plan is ﬁxed. This plan also allows for catch-up indexation like the
hybrid plan does, once again indicated by the dotted line.
3.2 Performance
We evaluate the performance of the three examples of policy ladders described in
Figures 1–3. Results are derived from Hoevenaars and Ponds (2007). The pension
fund under study is a stylized pension fund as a representative for industry-wide pen-
sionfundsintheNetherlands.AclassicALMstudyisappliedforahorizonof20years
(2006–2025). For each of the three variants, the asset mix is composed of 50% stocks
and50%bonds.Table1presentsmeansandrisksofthekeyvariables.Onaverage,the











Figure 4. Traditional DB
96 E. H. M. Ponds and B. Van Rielwage growth of 2%) and the discount-rate component (equal to 2.5%). On average,
therefore, the excess return of assets over the liability growth rate is 2%.
We set the initial real funding ratio at 85%,
2 reﬂecting the situation of under-
funding for many pension plans in the Netherlands in 2006.
Table 2 summarizes the classic ALM results for the three variants of plan design.
The note below the table explains the signiﬁcance of the indicators. The reported
evidence in this table provides insights regarding the question of how pension-plan
design (i.e. the structuring of the policy ladder) determines the way in which the risks
in the funding process are absorbed – by adjustments in contributions or by adjust-
ments in indexation rate or changes in the funding ratio.
The expected real funding ratio after 20 years in all three variants is improved
strongly from the low level of 85% in 2006, as shown by the mean and the median at
the end of the evaluation horizon, which reach values above 100%. The mismatch
risk for a 50–50 mix for the three variants is slightly higher than 8%. The variants
diﬀer in how this mismatch risk is absorbed. The traditional DB variant absorbs
mismatch risk by adjusting the contribution rate in order to restore a situation of
under-funding or over funding. This results in a high volatility of the contribution
rate. The average year-to-year change in the contribution rate is 3.3% points. The
funding ratio for risk and probability of under-funding are reduced strongly, due to
the ﬂexible contribution rate.
The hybrid plan makes use of two steering instruments to control solvency risk:
adjustments in contributions and indexation. As a result, the within probability of
nominal under-funding almost vanishes compared to the traditional DB plan. The
collective DC variant has ﬁxed contribution but ﬂexible indexation. The within
probability of under-funding is higher than the hybrid plan, reﬂecting the fact that the
contributions are no longer part of the risk-bearing process. This also explains that
the results of the indexation ratio are less favourable compared with the hybrid plan,










Figure 5. Collective DC
2 For the stylized pension fund, this implies a nominal funding ratio of 120%. A nominal funding ratio of
about 140% corresponds with a real funding ratio of 100%.





Rate of interest 4.5 1.0
Wage growth 2.0 1.0
Inﬂation 2.0 1.0
Discount rate real liabilities 2.5 1.0
Excess return 2.2 9.5







Figure 4 Figure 3 Figure 5
Indicators
Real Funding ratio*
Mean 2025 106% 106% 105%
Median 2025 106% 122% 110%
Standard deviation 2025 19% 16% 22%
mismatch risk av 20 yr 9% 8% 8%
within P(A<LN) 2025 11% 2% 5%
Contribution rate
Mean av 20 yr 18% 18% 17%
Jump per year av 20 yr 3.3% 2.6% 0%
Indexation ratio
Mean av 20 yr 100% 93% 91%
Median av 20 yr 100% 83% 79%
P(IR <100%) av 20 yr 0% 53% 56%
P(IR cum <90%) 2025 0% 16% 23%
P(IR cum <80%) 2025 0% 9% 15%
Notes: * initial real funding ratio 2006=85%.
The median, mean, and standard deviation of the real funding ratio are reported at the end of
the 20-year evaluation period. Mismatch risk, deﬁned as the degree of mismatch between the
payoﬀ structures of asset mix and liabilities, is measured by the standard deviation of the
growth rate of the funding ratio. The term within P(A<LN) denotes the within probability of
nominal under-funding; this is the probability of reaching a position of nominal under-funding
within the 20-year evaluation period. The third group of indicators relates to indexation
quality. The median, mean and standard deviation of the indexation ratio during the period of
20 years are shown. The yearly indexation ratio is measured as actual indexation over wage
growth. The term P(IR<100) indicates the frequency of less than full indexation. The
P(Ircum<90%) is an indicator of the indexation quality cumulative over the entire 20-year
period, the probability that the cumulative value of the indexation ratio at the end of the
20-year period is less than 90% (less than 80%, respectively) of cumulative end value of full
indexation.
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Pension-plan design is decisive with regard to how risk taken by the pension fund is
allocated among stakeholders. Table 3 summarizes for key risk measures the per-
formance of the three variants under study here. The key risk measures are as follows:
the average annual change of the contribution rate (column 1), the cumulative devi-
ation from full indexation (column 2), and the probability of nominal under-funding
(column 3). The asset mix is the same for the three variants, so total risk to be
distributed is the same for the three variants. The variants diﬀer in the way in which
risk is allocated over the stakeholders.
The table shows the various trade-oﬀs confronted in pension-plan design. Full
indexation in the traditional DB plan comes at the cost of both a higher risk of
nominal under-funding and a high volatility of contribution rates. Fixed contribution
rates in collective DC plans come mainly at the cost of high indexation risk. The
current hybrid plan takes a midway position in these trade-oﬀs: there is still volatility
in contribution rates and there is less-than-full indexation. What is gained in the
hybrid plans is a lower probability of nominal under-funding in comparison to both
traditional DB plans and collective DC plans.
4 Evaluating the shift to solvency-contingent average-wage salary plans
In real life, most if not all individuals fail to deﬁne and to execute the appropriate
pension savings strategy as suggested by modern theory due to missing markets,
myopia, a lack of necessary knowledge, and so on. The guiding principle in assessing
pension plan design should be the added value of a speciﬁc plan in assisting in-
dividuals to realize their preferences with respect to retirement income. How well does
the construct of the new plan setting perform in meeting this guiding principle?
4.1 Welfare comparison
The shift to the hybrid plan structure may be preferred from the perspective of sol-
vency risk management. One may wonder whether the hybrid plan is the preferred
pension plan for the participants as well. Within an ideal setting with complete
markets and no costs, Cui et al. (2007) perform a welfare comparison of a variety







than 80% of cumulative full




at the end of 2025
Traditional DB 3.2 0 11
Collective DC 0 15 5
Current hybrid plan 2.6 9 2
Note: * See Table 2 for explanations. Bold ﬁgures indicate the highest risk.
Sharing risk: the Netherlands’ new approach to pensions 99of realistic collective pension plans with as a benchmark the lifecycle-based
optimal individual scheme. As to the latter, the individual can optimally choose the
consumption level, savings rate, and portfolio composition (under a borrowing con-
straint) at any time throughout his life (Merton, 1969). Cui et al. ﬁnd that for diﬀerent
degrees of risk tolerance a collective plan structured like a Dutch hybrid plan
with ﬂexible beneﬁts and ﬂexible contributions is welfare-superior to the optimal in-
dividual scheme (compare Table 4). The welfare gain is larger compared to a standard
DC plan with a ﬁxed contribution rate. For individuals with low or moderate levels
of risk tolerance, the individual scheme is dominant vis-a`-vis collective plans
with only one instrument of risk bearing, either via ﬂexible contributions only (as
the traditional DB) or via ﬂexible beneﬁts only (as the collective DC). Hence,
more eﬃcient risk sharing can be achieved by using more than one risk absorber.
The hybrid plan performs well because of its broad risk bearing capacity as risks
can be shared among current workers, current retirees, and future participants.
Therefore, the hybrid plan is more capable than the other plans of exploiting the
equity risk premium in stocks. The welfare gain is the largest for the less risk-averse
agent, whereas the more riskaverse agent obtains less welfare gain. This may be
counterintuitive at ﬁrst sight. The key reason is that the less risk-averse agent is
willing to accept a more risky portfolio, and therefore to share more risk inter-
generationally and thus to beneﬁt more from intergenerational risk sharing.
Table 4 also reports the welfare results when the equity premium is reduced from
4% to 3%, which probably is a better reﬂection of current capital market pricing.
The relative welfare levels of the collective plans fall as the lower equity premium
diminishes the advantages of intergenerational risk sharing. Note the optimal
individual plan now performs almost as good as the hybrid plan and they both beat












3 100% x2.4% +2.0% x2.4% +3.9%
5 100% x2.8% x0.3% x2.8% +2.3%
8 100% x2.3% x1.3% x2.7% +0.9%
equity premium=3%
3 100% x2.3% +0.5% x2.2% +1.9%
5 100% x2.1% x0.8% x2.2% +0.8%
8 100% x2.0% x1.5% x2.0% +0.1%
Source: Cui et al. (2007), Tables 1 and 5. We have adjusted the labels of the plans for the labels
in our paper. The table above reports the welfare gain (+) or welfare loss (x) from the per-
spective of a new 25-year participant with the optimal individual plan as benchmark (absolute
welfare level set at 100%) for diﬀerent degree of risk aversion (CRR) and for an equity
premium of 4% respectively 3%. Welfare eﬀects are evaluated for a 55-years horizon, con-
sisting of a 40 years working period and a 15 years retirement period. See Cui et al. for more
details.
100 E. H. M. Ponds and B. Van Rielthe other plans. The analysis probably will turn in favour of the collective plans when
real-life features are added to the analysis, like incomplete markets and the higher
costs
3 of running individual plans. In turn, however, the prolongation of collective
plans is only possible as long as young and new participants retain conﬁdence in these
plans. Figure 6 displays results of a survey among Dutch households regarding the
conﬁdence in institutions in the ﬁeld of retirement income provisions. The conﬁdence
of the general public in Dutch pension funds is very high compared with the outcome
for the government and banks and insurers. This conﬁdence in funds is even increased
recently after the solvency crisis. This high level of conﬁdence enables Dutch person
to continue the collective hyrbid plan in order to reap the beneﬁts of intergenerational
risk sharing. As conﬁdence is highly ‘man-made’, this puts a high responsibility on
pension fund managers to arrive at good governance
4 in order to safeguard time-
consistency by controlling the risk of severe underfunding and generational equity, in
particular as to the position of the younger members.
4.2 Value transfers from old to young
A pension fund essentially is a zero-sum game. The total value to be distributed
within the pension fund at a speciﬁc point in time is given, and is equal to the value of
assets under management. The content of the pension deal is decisive with regard to
how the total value is distributed among stakeholders. Changes in the policy setup of
a pension fund may easily lead to redistribution of value and risk among the mem-
bers. Hoevenaars and Ponds (2007) make use of the so-called method of value-based














Figure 6. Conﬁdence (moderate to high) in retirement income providing institutions
Source: van Dalen and Henkens (2006). The bars display the relative share of people,
diﬀerentiated to their life-phase and where the total reﬂects the weighted average, with
a moderate to high conﬁdence in institutions delivering retirement income provisions:
banks and insurance (taken together), government and pension funds.
3 Bikker and de Dreu (2007) report for the period 2000–2004 that operational costs expressed as percentage
of gross contributions for individual plans oﬀered by life insurance in the Netherlands are eight times
higher than for the collective plans for Dutch pension funds, 24% of gross contributions for insurers
respectively 3.5% for pension funds.
4 Compare Ambachtsheer (2007) for a thorough analysis of necessary conditions to arrive at good pension
fund governance.
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policy changes. Figure 4 shows redistribution between plan members due to a switch
from the traditional DB plan to a hybrid DB-DC plan, respectively, from the tra-
ditional DB plan to a collective DC plan.
Figure 7 reveals that the step from the traditional DB plan to either the hybrid
DB–DC plan or the collective DC plan leads to redistribution from old to young. The
elderly members lose value, as they have to accept that a de facto unconditional
indexation policy is replaced by ﬂexible beneﬁts, depending on the ﬁnancial sound-
ness of the fund. The younger members win, since part of the risk bearing and
funding burden can be shared with the elderly members.
4.3 Transparency
A ﬁnal-pay DB plan may be criticized for several reasons; however, it has the ad-
vantage of being simple regarding the pension result. Informed participants will easily
understand that their pension result is equal to: (number of years of service)r
(accrual rate)r(ﬁnal-pay). Indexation after retirement follows the reference wage
growth of the industry. Dutch funds have replaced this simple rule by an average
wage plan, where the pension result will be determined by the wage path over the
career, and the yearly accrual rate, where indexation is contingent on realized in-
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Hybrid DB-DC minus Traditional DB Collective DC minus Traditional DB
Figure 7. Value redistribution between generations over 2006–2025 when from
traditional DB plan to hybrid DB-DC plan or to collective DC plan (as % of total
nominal liabilities 2006)
Source: Hoevenaars and Ponds (2007). The horizontal axis denotes the age of the
cohorts in the plan in 2006. The analysis looks 20 years forward, so also members of
cohort x2 will be part of the labor force in 2025. The cohort with an age of 105 will die
with certainty within one year. The vertical axis reports the change in generational
accounts of each of the age cohorts (generations).
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from the policy ladder if circumstances motivate them to do. So the construct of a
policy ladder at best will not be supportive to reduce pension illiteracy among the
general public. This is worrying as a recent survey (van Rooij et al., 2007) has pointed
out that 44% of respondents do not know the type of pension scheme that they are
covered by, 61% do not know about their pension rights, and 65% have no idea
about the scale of their future beneﬁts. Pension funds recently have started to im-
prove their communication to their members. This indeed may result in greater
consciousness among the members.
4.4 Contingent claims
Even for well-informed optimizing individuals, the implementation of a solvency-
contingent indexation policy may lead to a welfare loss due to its inherent contingent
claim structure. Modern economics models the savings process as the outcome of the
preferred spreading of lifetime resources over lifetime consumption. Individuals aim
to maintain the standard-of-living they have been used to before retirement. A wage-
indexed deﬁned beneﬁt plan is an ideal provision to realize this aim as the accrued
pension rights automatically are adjusted for nominal wage increases, being the sum
of price inﬂation and real income growth. DB pension rights indeed oﬀer a real
guarantee to their holders. The switch from a de facto unconditional indexation
towards a solvency-contingent indexation may be seen as a welfare loss for optimising
individuals. Part of the labour remuneration is related to stock market performance,
making future pension income uncertain in real purchasing power terms. A full res-
toration of the initial position will require trading a complex set of contingent claims
being the oﬀsetting mirror of the set of contingent claims involved in the policy ladder
structure. Optimizing individuals may use their other wealth sources to undo changes
in risk exposure, for example by going short in equities and long in indexed bonds.
However, markets are far from complete and individuals may be borrowing-
constrained, so it may be impossible to implement an oﬀsetting strategy. In particu-
lar, the elderly may be hurt as their remaining lifetime is short and their capacity to
absorb risk is small.
5 The jury is still out
The solvency crisis in 2001–2004 urged Dutch pension funds to reconsider their ﬁnal-
pay plans with de facto unconditional indexation. In the Dutch societal setting, a plan
redesign required a new compromise between employers, employees, and retirees.
Most pension funds have found a solution by switching to an average-wage plan with
solvency-contingent indexation and contributions. The reported ALM evidence has
made clear that solvency risk management indeed has improved considerably. We
have characterized the new design as a hybrid DB–DC plan. On the one hand, it is
DB, because the yearly accrual of pension rights is speciﬁed in the same way as a
traditional DB plan, and because contributions are ﬂexible, depending on the
ﬁnancial position of the pension fund. On the other hand, this plan is DC, as the
Sharing risk: the Netherlands’ new approach to pensions 103yearly indexation is related to the ﬁnancial position of the fund and therefore is
related to investment returns.
The guiding principle in assessing pension plan design should be the added value of
a speciﬁc plan in assisting the individual participants to realize their preferences with
respect to retirement income. A ﬁnal assessment of the new plan is not yet possible as
‘the jury is still out’.
The hybrid plan appears to be welfare-dominant compared to collective plans with
less risk sharing capacity (traditional DB and collective DC) and also compared to
individual plans (the optimal lifecycle planning model and standard DC plan). Dutch
pension funds are able to exploit the beneﬁts of intergenerational risk sharing as a
buildingblock for risk management due to the high conﬁdence of the general public in
these institutions. As conﬁdence is highly ‘man-made’, this puts a high responsibility
on the shoulders of boards of trustees to safeguard key aspects of collective risk shar-
ing, in particular generational equity and controlling the risk of severe underfunding.
There are also serious drawbacks in the redesign, however. The change to solvency-
contingent average-wage salary plan has led to considerable value redistribution in
favour of younger participants at the expense of elderly workers and retirees. We
have serious doubts about the degree to which plan participants and their rep-
resentatives are aware of the direction and size of this value redistribution. If they
would understand, it is highly questionable if they all would agree. A point of concern
is that the general public in the Netherlands is highly illiterate on pension issues. This
illiteracy among many plan members is worrying as the pension design change im-
plies that they have to bear more risk. The real guaranteed pension promise of the
ﬁnal-pay plan is replaced by a projected pension income that at best provides the
same result, but probably lower. As far as plan members are aware of their higher
risk exposure, they will have diﬃculties in cancelling out the higher risk exposure in
ﬁnancial markets and restoring their initial preferred position. The inherent contin-
gent claim structure of the new plan is simply too complex.
References
Ambachtsheer, K. P. (2007) Pension Revolution: A Solution to the Pensions Crisis. Wiley
Finance.
Bikker, J. and J. de Dreu (2007) Operating costs of pension schemes. In Steenbeek O. W. and
S. G. van der Lecq (2007)
Boeri, T., A. L. Bovenberg, B. Coeure ´ , and A. Roberts (2006) Dealing with the New Giants:
Rethinking the Role of Pension Funds. CEPR Geneva Reports on the World Economy.
Cui J., F. De Jong, and E. H. M. Ponds (2007) Intergenerational risk sharing in collective
pension schemes. Working paper Netspar, Tilburg University.
Hills, J. (2006) A new pension settlement for the twenty-ﬁrst century? The UK Pensions
Commission’s Analysis and Proposals. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(1): 113–132.
Hoevenaars, R. M. and E. H. M. Ponds (2007) Valuation of intergenerational transfers in
funded collective pension schemes. Netspar working paper, forthcoming in Insurance:
Mathematics and Economics.
Laboul, A. and J. Yermo (2006) Regulatory principles and regulation. In G. L. Clark, A. H.
Munnell, and J. M. Orszag (eds), Oxford Handbook of Pensions and Retirement Income.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
104 E. H. M. Ponds and B. Van RielMerton, R. C. (1969) Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: The continuous-time case.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 51, August, 247–257.
Munnell, A. H. (2006) Employer-sponsored plans: the shift from deﬁned beneﬁt to deﬁned
contribution. In G. L. Clark, A. H. Munnell, and J. M. Orszag (eds), Oxford Handbook of
Pensions and Retirement Income. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ponds, E. H. M. and B. van Riel (2007) The recent evolution of pension funds in the
Netherlands: the trend to hybrid DB-DC plans and beyond, working paper 2007–9, Center
for Retirement Research at Boston College (data and trends available on request).
Steenbeek, O. W. and S. G. van der Lecq (eds) (2007) Costs and Beneﬁts of Collective Pension
Systems. Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.
Van Dalen, H. and K. Henkens (2006) Vertrouwen in pensioenfondsen: wie kennis
vermeerdert … Economisch-Statistiche Berichten, pp. 616–618.
Van Riel, B., A. Hemerijck, and J. Visser (2003) Is there a Dutch way to pension reform? In
G. L. Clark and N. Whiteside (eds), Pension Security in the 21st Century. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Van Rooij, M., C. Kool, and H. Prast (2007) Risk-return preferences in the pension domain:
are people able to choose? Journal of Public Economics, 91: 701–722.
Sharing risk: the Netherlands’ new approach to pensions 105